Brief Facts
- An FIR was registered under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the present Respondent namely Dr. Partap Singh Verka and a co-accused, Vikas. Vikas was caught red-handed accepting `5,000. The respondent was also arrested the same day.
- Thereafter, both the accused persons were granted bail in May 2016. However, the charge-sheet filed by the investigating agency named only Vikas as an accused and the name of the Respondent was not included.
- However, during the course of trial, the Complainant (PW-1) in his examination-in-chief, said that it was the present respondent who had demanded the bribe and it was on his behalf the accused, Vikas had received the bribe amount.
- Thereafter, the state moved an application under section 319 CrPC for summoning the respondent as an Accused, which was allowed and the respondent was summoned to face the trial.
- Aggrieved by this, the Respondent moved the High Court, whereby the Court set aside the order of the Ld. Trial Court as sanction under sec. 19 of the P.C Act had not been taken.
- Aggrieved by the same, the state preferred this appeal before the Supreme Court.
Issues
- Whether the court can take cognizance against any public servant for offences committed under section 7,11,13 and 15 of the P.C Act, on an application under section 319 CrPC, without following the mandate of section 19 of the P.C Act.
Held
- The Supreme Court found no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court and consequentially, dismissed the appeal filed by the State. The findings of the Court are as under:
- The Supreme Court relied on the decisions in Dilawar Singh v. Parvinder Singh, (2005) 12 SCC 709, Paul Verghese v. State of Kerala, (2007) 14 SCC 783 and Surinderjit Singh Mand v. State of Punjab (2016) 8 SCC 722 and held thatit is a well settled position of law that courts cannot take cognizance against any public servant for offences committed under Sections 7,11,13 & 15 of the P.C. Act, even on an application under section 319 of the CrPC, without first following the requirements of Section 19 of the P.C Act. Here, the correct procedure should have been for the prosecution to obtain sanction under Section 19 of the P.C Act from the appropriate Government, before formally moving an application before the Court under Section 319 of CrPC. In fact, the Trial Court too should have insisted on the prior sanction, which it did not. In absence of the sanction the entire procedure remains flawed. We are completely in agreement by the decision of the High Court and therefore are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court and accordingly this appeal is hereby dismissed.
Relevant Para No.
- 8,9,10 and 11