Brief Facts
- A complaint was filed in the office of Chief Minister of Chattisgarh against an IRS officer and the former Principal Secretary of Chhattisgarh, alleging involvement in corruption, money laundering, and holding disproportionate assets. The Chief Minister ordered an inquiry by the Economic Offences Wing (EOW), which registered a preliminary inquiry. Prior to these developments, the accused challenged a departmental inquiry by filing a Writ (WPCR) in the High Court, whereby the High Court directed the State not to take any steps to her prejudice. During the pendency of WPCR, the FIR was registered against Accused. Following which the accused applied to amend the writ petition to contest the FIR and sought interim relief for stay of effect/operation of the FIR. Another accused also filed a WPCR to quash the FIR. The High Court allowed the application for amendments and directed that no coercive steps be taken against accused till the next date of hearing and ultimately allowed the petition filed by the one accused and quashed FIR and another petition filed by another accused was partly allowed.
- Aggrieved by the order passed by the Hon’ble High Court, State of Chhattisgarh filed an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
Issues
- Whether the High court was justified in its interference with the FIR?
- Whether and to what extent the High Court possesses the authority to quash FIR for offence u/s 13 of Prevention of Corruption Act, while the police embark on investigation?
- Whether the FIR can be registered merely on the basis of suspicion?
- Whether different yardstick are adopted while considering the quashing of the FIR registered for the offence under the PC Act?
Held
- The Apex Court held that the High Court was not justified in its interference with the investigative procedures and committed a grave error in quashing the F.I.R on the grounds it did. The Court referenced Sections 2(c) and 13(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (PC Act) to define “Public Servant” and highlighted that intentional illicit enrichment by a public servant during their tenure constitutes criminal misconduct. The law prohibits any public servant from intentionally enriching themselves illicitly while in service. An increase in the assets of a public servant indicates constitutionally impermissible conduct, warranting scrutiny under the PC Act.
- It being the settled principle of law that when an investigation is yet to start, there should be no scrutiny to what extent the allegations in a first information report are probable, reliable or genuine and also that a first information report can be registered merely on suspicion, the High Court ought to have realized that the FIR which, according to it, was based on “probabilities” ought not to have been interdicted. Viewed through the prism of gravity of allegations, a first information report based on “probability” of a crime having been committed would obviously be of a higher degree as compared to a first information report lodged on a “mere suspicion” that a crime has been committed. The High Court failed to bear in mind these principles and precisely did what it was not supposed to do at this stage. We are, thus, unhesitatingly of the view that the High Court was not justified in its interference on the ground it did.
Different Yardstick for FIRs under PC Act.
- Finally, following the above, what is of substantial importance is that if criminal prosecution is based upon adequate evidence and the same is otherwise justifiable, it does not become vitiated on account of significant political overtones and mala fide motives. We can say without fear of contradiction, it is not in all cases in our country that an individual, who is accused of acts of omission/commission punishable under the P.C. Act but has the blessings of the ruling dispensation, is booked by the police and made to face prosecution. If, indeed, in such a case (where a prosecution should have been but has not been launched) the succeeding political dispensation initiates steps for launching prosecution against such an accused but he/she is allowed to go scot-free, despite there being materials against him/her, merely on the ground that the action initiated by the current regime is mala fide in the sense that it is either to settle scores with the earlier regime or to wreak vengeance against the individual, in such an eventuality we are constrained to observe that it is criminal justice that would be the casualty. This is because, it is difficult to form an opinion conclusively at the stage of reading a first information report that the public servant is either in or not in possession of property disproportionate to the known sources of his/her income. It would all depend on what is ultimately unearthed after the investigation is complete. Needless to observe, the first information report in a disproportionate assets case must, as of necessity, prima facie, contain ingredients for the perception that there is fair enough reason to suspect commission of a cognizable offence relating to “criminal misconduct” punishable under the P.C. Act and to embark upon an investigation. Having regard to what we have observed above and to maintain probity in the system of governance as well as to ensure that societal pollutants are weeded out at the earliest, it would be eminently desirable if the High Courts maintain a hands-off approach and not quash a first information report pertaining to “corruption” cases, specially at the stage of investigation, even though certain elements of strong-arm tactics of the ruling dispensation might be discernible.
- The considerations that could apply to quashing of first information reports pertaining to offences punishable under general penal statutes ex proprio vigore may not be applicable to a P.C. Act offence. Majorly, the proper course for the high courts to follow, in cases under the P.C. Act, would be to permit the investigation to be taken to its logical conclusion and leave the aggrieved party to pursue the remedy made available by law at an appropriate stage. If at all interference in any case is considered necessary, the same should rest on the very special features of the case. Although what would constitute the special features has necessarily to depend on the peculiar facts of each case, interference could be made in exceptional cases where the records reveal absolutely no material to support even a reasonable suspicion of a public servant having intentionally enriched himself illicitly during the period of his service and nothing other than mala fide is the basis for subjecting such servant to an investigation. We quite appreciate that there could be cases of innocent public servants being entangled in investigations arising out of motivated complaints and the consequent mental agony, emotional pain and social stigma that they would have to encounter in the process, but this small price has to be paid if there is to be a society governed by the rule of law. While we do not intend to fetter the high courts from intervening in appropriate cases, it is only just and proper to remind the courts to be careful, circumspect and cautious in quashing first information reports resting on mala fide of the nature alleged herein.
Relevant Para No.
61, 74