Brief Facts
- In this case, the Appellant was convicted for the offence under Section 120-B IPC. The two other co-accused persons (A-1 and A-2) were convicted for the offence of theft, house-trespass and destruction of valuable property. The case pertained to theft in the Bank wherein the theft was carried out in locker room without breaking the locks. The stolen amount was recovered from one accused on the basis of the statement of the other accused. Since the locks of the Bank were not broken, it was presumed that locks were opened with the key. The Appellant was having the custody of one set of keys and it was alleged that the Appellant had conspired with the other accused person in committing the offence.
Issues
- Whether physical manifestation of agreement to commit an offence is required to attract the offence of Criminal Conspiracy under Section 120B of the IPC?
- Whether the recovery of the stolen money can be ground to exonerate the accused person?
Held
- Concurrent findings were reversed by the Apex Court.
- Mere recovery of the stolen amount by the Bank does not exonerate A-1 and A-2 and for that matter, even the Appellant. We, therefore, have no hesitation in rejecting this submission.
- The principal ingredient of the offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B of the IPC is an agreement to commit an offence. Such an agreement must be proved through direct or circumstantial evidence. Court has to necessarily ascertain whether there was an agreement between the accused persons. In the decision of State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan (2000) 8 SCC 203, this Court noted that an agreement forms the core of the offence of conspiracy, and it must surface in evidence through some physical manifestation.
- The charge of conspiracy alleged by the prosecution against the Appellant must evidence explicit acts or conduct on his part, manifesting conscious and apparent concurrence of a common design with A-1 and A-2.
- It is not necessary that there must be a clear, categorical and express agreement between the accused. However, an implied agreement must manifest upon relying on principles established in the cases of circumstantial evidence.
- The prosecution has failed to produce any evidence whatsoever to satisfy the Court that there was a prior meeting of minds between the Appellant and A-1 and A-2. There is no physical manifestation of such a concurrence extractable from surrounding circumstances, declarations, or the conduct of the Appellant. The evidence is shorn of even a passive acknowledgment of conspiracy of the Appellant with the accused, let alone heralding a clear and conscientious participation of the Appellant in the conspiracy.
Relevant Para No.
- 15, 22, 23, 25 & 26.