Brief Facts
- That on 15.03.2000 the appellant came to the residence of the prosecutrix and committed the offence punishable under Section 376 IPC, brandishing a knife and the Appellate ran away from the house on seeing the brother of victim. The father of the prosecutrix filed a complaint for quarrel alone as he felt that the dignity of his daughter (PW 6) was at stake. Thereafter, the appellant along with the few other co-accused persons went to the residence of the uncle of the prosecutrix wherein she was temporarily staying anticipating trouble, and exerted threats and in pursuance of the same FIR No.60/2000 was lodged on 13.04.2000 under Sections 376, 452, 506 IPC. During the course of trial the brother and uncle of the victim were not examined and even the knife was not recovered from the Appellant. The Parties had even compromised the matter in the year 2013. The Trial Court convicted the Appellant after relying upon the testimonies of the Victim and her father and the same was upheld by the High Court.
Issues
- Who would be a material witness in a case and what would be the impact of non-examination of material witness?
- Whether the prosecution was able to justify the delay in filing of FIR and the prosecution was able to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
Held
- This court has, time and again, stated that the principle of proportionality should guide the sentencing process. In Ahmed Hussein Vali Mohammed Saiyed v. State of Gujarat, 2009 [8] SCR 719, it was held that the sentence should “deter the criminal from achieving the avowed object to (sic break the) law,” and the endeavour should be to impose an “appropriate sentence.” The court also held that imposing “meagre sentences” “merely on account of lapse of time” would be counterproductive. Likewise, in Jameel v. State of U. P., 2009 [15] SCR 712, while advocating that sentencing should be fact dependent exercises, the court also emphasised that “the law should adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation, sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration.”
- Again, in Guru Basavaraj v. State of Karnataka, 2012 [8] SCR 189, the court stressed that it “is the duty of the court to see that appropriate sentence is imposed regard being had to the commission of the crime and its impact on the social order” and that sentencing includes “adequate punishment”. In G. Goswami v. Delhi Administration, 1974 [1] SCR 222, the court considered the issue of punishment and observed that punishment is designed to protect society by deterring potential offenders as well as prevent the guilty party from repeating the offence; it is also designed to reform the offender and reclaim him as a law-abiding citizen for the good of the society as a whole. Reformatory, deterrent and punitive aspects of punishment thus play their due part in judicial thinking while determining the question of awarding appropriate sentences.
- The sentencing in this case, to put it mildly, is inexplicable (if not downright bizarre). On the one hand, Krishan underwent sentence for 9 years 4 months- at the other end of the spectrum, Sunder s/o Rajpal underwent only 11 months. No rationale appears from the reasoning of the High Court for this wide disparity. It is not as though the court took note of the role ascribed to the accused (such a course was not possible, given the nature of the evidence). If it were assumed that the age of the accused played a role, then Krishan, at 61 years- who served 9 years and Brahmajit, who had served in the army, and was detained for over 8 years got the stiffest sentence. On the other end of the scale, younger persons were left relatively unscathed, having served between 3 years and 11 months. The impugned judgment, in this court’s opinion, fell into error in not considering the gravity of the offence. Having held all the accused criminally liable, under Section 304 Part II read with Section 149 IPC and also not having found any distinguishing feature in the form of separate roles played by each of them, the imposition of the “sentence undergone” criteria, amounted to an aberration, and the sentencing is for that reason, flawed. This court is, therefore, of the view that given the totality of circumstances (which includes the fact that the accused have been at large for the past four years), the appropriate sentence would be five years rigorous imprisonment. However, at the same time, the court is cognizant of the fact Krishan and Bramhajit served more than that period. Therefore, the impugned judgment, as far as they are concerned, is left undisturbed. Consequently, the sentence of Raju, Parveen, Sunder s/o Amit Lal, Sandeep, Nar Singh, and Sunder s/o Rajpal is hereby modified; they are hereby sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for five years. They shall surrender and serve the rest of their sentences within six weeks from today.
Relevant Para No.
- 10, 11, 15, 16