Kalvakuntal Kavitha v. Directorate of Enforcement, Criminal Appeal No. 3522/2024

Brief Facts

  • The Appeal was filed against the Order of the High Court whereby the Bail Application of the Appellant was rejected.
  • The Trial Court and the High Court while rejecting the bail of the Appellant had rejected the prayer of the Appellant for the benefit of proviso to Section 45 by considering that Applicant herself that she is a well-educated and accomplished woman, who has remained Member of Parliament, Member of Legislative Council, etc. and thus, the benefit of proviso to section 45 of the PMLA cannot be extended to the Applicant as the same is beneficial provision for “vulnerable women”. High Court placed reliance on the case of Saumya Chaurasia v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2024) 6 SCC 401 to deny the applicability of proviso to section 45 in the present case.

Issues

  • Whether the proviso to Section 45(1) of the PMLA would entitle a woman for special treatment?
  • Whether the proviso to Section 45(1) of the PMLA is applicable only to a “vulnerable woman” ?
  • What should be the approach of the courts while granting the benefit of the proviso to Section 45(1) of the PMLA Act?

Held

  • The Supreme court quashed and set aside the order of the High Court and accepted the bail application of the Appellant. The Court opined that benefit of proviso to section 45 of the PMLA cannot be denied to the Appellant.
  • We had also reiterated the well-established principle that “bail is the rule and refusal is an exception”. We had further observed that the fundamental right of liberty provided under Article 21 of the Constitution is superior to the statutory restrictions. The findings of the Court are as under:

Applicability of proviso to section 45

  • We are further of the view that the proviso to Section 45(1) of the PMLA would entitle a woman for special treatment while her prayer for bail is being considered.
  • A perusal of the proviso to section 45 would thus reveal that the proviso permits certain category of accused including woman to be released on bail, without the twin requirement under Section 45 of the PMLA to be satisfied. No doubt that, as argued by the learned ASG, in a given case the accused even if a woman may not be automatically entitled to benefit of the said proviso and it would all depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
  • However, when a statute specifically provides a special treatment for a certain category of accused, while denying such a benefit, the Court will be required to give specific reasons as to why such a benefit is to be denied.

Whether benefit of proviso to section 45 is available only to vulnerable women.

  • We find that the learned Single Judge erroneously observed that the proviso to Section 45(1) of the PMLA is applicable only to a “vulnerable woman”.
  • A perusal of the judgment of this Court in the case of Saumya Chaurasia v. Directorate of Enforcement (2024) 6 SCC 401 would show that this Court has observed that the Courts need to be more sensitive and sympathetic towards the category of persons included in the first proviso to Section 45 of the PMLA and similar provisions in the other Acts. The Court observes that the persons of tender age and women who are likely to be more vulnerable may sometimes be misused by unscrupulous elements and made scapegoats for committing such crime.
  • No doubt that this Court observes that nowadays the educated and well-placed women in the society engage themselves in commercial ventures and enterprises and advertently or inadvertently engage themselves in the illegal activities. The Court therefore puts a caution that the Courts, while deciding such matters, should exercise the discretion judiciously using their prudence.
  • This Court, in the carefully couched paragraph extracted above used the phrase “persons of tender age and woman who are likely to be more vulnerable, may sometimes be misused by the unscrupulous elements”. This is vastly different from saying that the proviso to Section 45(1) of the PMLA applies only to “vulnerable woman”. Further, this Court in the case of Saumya Chaurasia (supra) does not say that merely because a woman is highly educated or sophisticated or a Member of Parliament or a Member of Legislative Assembly, she is not entitled to the benefit of the proviso to Section 45(1) of the PMLA.

Relevant Para No.

  • 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25 and 27

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